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Summary
The prima ry concern of this paper is to discuss the role
of various economic factors in explaining corruption in
tax administration. The emphasis is on how the incentive
structure of the tax system affects the decisions of tax
collectors to engage in fraudulent behaviour. It is argued
that divergent motivations of the individuals involved and
imperfeet information lie at the core of understanding
these probIerns. Divergent motivations open up the door
to strategic behaviour where agents are pursuing their
personal goals, and not the success of the institution. This
is a particular problem when information is asymmetric
across individuals. Such informational asymmetries may
be significant in the tax administration. The paper starts
with a set of research questions based on empirical
observations from local governments in Tanzania, and
examines the fundamental ideas, basic assumptions and
limitations of possible theoretical approaches to
answering these questions.
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1 Introduction
Corruption seems to take place in practically every country in the world, and should be
considered a potential problem everyhere. Still, corrption appears to hit developing
countries hardest (Transparency International, 1998). In arecent survey covering public and
private sector leaders in more than 60 developing countries, corrption in the public sector
was rated as the major obstac1e for economic growth and development (Kaufmann, 1997 and
1999).
One of the areas of governent where corrption looms largest is in the assessment and
collection oftaxes (Galtung, 1995:1). Studies in different developing countries indicate that
it is not uncommon that half or more of the taxes that should be collected cannot be traced by
the Treasury (Bird, 1990, 1992; Alm et aL., 1991; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999). This tax
base erosion has had a variety of fiscal effects and there are at least three reasons for
concern. First, revenue losses from tax evasion and corrption become particularly damaging
at a time of substantial budget deficit. Second, both horizontal and vertical equity suffer
because the effective tax rates faced by individuals may differ due to different opportunities
for bribing (Alm et aL., 1991: 849). Third, there is a growing concern aboutthe expanding
underground economic activities, and how these activities affect economic policies (Tanzi
and Shome, 1993:808). Acts of corrption by tax collectors often play a role in promoting or
sustaining underground economic activities and in facilitating tax evasion (Tanzi, 1994: 17;
Tanzi, 1995). Fiscal corrption thus contributes to undermining the legitimacy of
governent. Furthermore, citizens' disrespect for the tax laws may expand disrespect for
other laws.
Fiscal corrption are caused by the aggregate effects of numerous decisions by taxpayers, tax
collectors, administrators, and political decision makers. Individuals resp ond to the natural,
cultural, social, political, legal and economic environment that surrounds them. In this paper
we will concentrate on economic explanations and mainly consider the economic
consequences of corrption in tax administration. The emphasis is on how incentives and
disincentives in the tax system (inc1uding the tax administration) affect tax collectors'
decisions about whether to engage in fraudulent behaviour or not. We argue that divergent
motivations and imperfect information lie at the core of understanding these probIerns.
Divergent motivations open up the door to strategic behaviour where agents are pursuing
their personal gains, rather than the success of the institution. This is a paricular problem
when information is asymmetri c across individuals. Such informational asymmetries may be
significant in tax administration.
Our focus on the economic forms and ways of explaining this phenomon does not imply that
we believe that these are the only aspects of importance. Other aspects like social networks,
family relations and norms matter, and may also be important in certain contexts. However,
we consider this as mainly an issue of professional division of labour.
We wIl use Tanzania as our frame of reference. In Transparency International 's corrption
perception index for 1998, covering 85 countries, Tanzania is ranked aside Nigeria as one of
the most corrpt countries. Corrption is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania. Wastage,
corrption and mismanagement in the public sector have grown significantly since the late
1970s. According to Mukandala (1983:261), the civil service in the early 1980s was
"increasingly riddled by corrption and embezzlement of public funds". The Auditor
General's reports from the 1980s show that this trend continued (Semboja and Therkildsen,
1992:1103). By the mid 1990s, corrption in Tanzania had become rampant in all sectors of
1
the economy and politics (Commission on Corrption, URT 1996).1 In tax administration
these issues have been particularly pressing, given the need to raise more tax revenues. Thus,
the Indian Ocean Newsletter (no. 726, 6 Ju1y 1996:1) refers to (fiscalJ corrption and tax
evasion as the country's two major ilIs.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the concept of fiscal corrption is defined.
Section 3 focuses on possible causes of fiscal corrption. Our point of departure is economic
theory of organisations, and we discuss questions of imperfect information and the incentive
(motivation) problems that such questions imply in tax administration. Critical factors in this
respect are how the tax law is administered, perceptions about tax enforcement, inc1uding the
probability of being detected and punished, and the size of the potential gain of fraudulent
behaviour. We also discuss the impacts of collusion among taxpayers and collectors on these
parameters.
The main part of the paper is written around four questions that refer to observed phenomena
of fiscal corrption in local authorities in Tanzania based on findings from a research project
recently conc1uded2:
1. What impacts have wage incentives on the performance of tax collectors?
In section 4, we examine the correlation between wage incentives and corrption. We
discuss the efficiency ofwage incentives in curbing corrption.
2. What impacts do controls and monitoring have on the tax collector's performance?
The aim of the monitoring policy is to get the auditors to identify and report tax fraud. The
wage contract between the governent and the tax collector will then inc1ude the probability
of an audit. However, such contracts are very sensitive to strategic behaviour, inc1uding
collusion, from the parties involved. Section 5 examines possible incentive problems related
to monitoring and auditing.
3. What impacts do public sector regulations have on the incidence of corruption?
The focus in section 6 is on how the tax structure and characteristics of the tax system may
facilitate corrption.
4. What impacts does the institutional set-up of local authorities, including the bureaucratic
structure, have on the incidence of corruption?
In section 7, we consider how the bureaucratie structure oflocal authorities in Tanzania may
itself affect the incidenee of corrption. The govemanee structure is relatively complex. In
addition, foreign aid organisations are heavily involved in some councils. This agency
structure, characterised with several principals who independently try to influence local
governent revenue mobilisation and, thus, the actions of the tax collectors, may result in
severe weakening of incentives for the collectors.
Based on the discussion in previous sections, section 8 reports on the mechanisms and scope
of fiscal corrption in local authorities in Tanzania.
The preceding analysis does not explain why corrption levels vary across local authorities
in spite of similar tax structures and administrative set-ups, inc1uding wage and monitoring
l The Commission, led by Joseph Warioba, was appointed in January J 996 by the then newly elected president Benjamin
Mkapa. Its task was to identify the extent and causes of corruption in the country as part of the Government 's strategy to
fighting corruption. The Commission submitted its report in December J 996. Some of the findings and recommendations of
the Warioba-report are summarised in appendix J.2 The project "Tax evasion and fiscal corruption in developing countries: A study of the loeal government tax
administration in Tanzania" was initiated in J 996 and conduded in J 999. The project was led by the author and carried
out in dose collaboration with professor Joseph Semboja.
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systems. In section 9, we explore a theoretical approach that may contribute to explaining
these observations.
Finally, in section 10, we briefly sketch some policy implications for fighting fiscal
corrption. Relevant issues in this respect are measures to (i) reduce the opportunities for
corrption, (ii) improve incentives for tax collectors, and (iii) impose credible sanctions
against culprits. Furthermore, we argue that it is important to identify and account for the
ro les of all key stakeholders in the tax enforcement proeess.
2 What is fiseal eorruption?
The term corruption comes from the Latin verb to break, rumpere, which implies that
something is broken. This something might be a moral or social code of conduct, or more
of ten an administrative rule. The corrption literature has pursued a number of different
strands, and no single definition of corrption is generally accepted. A common and simple
definition of corrption is that it is the abuse of public power for private benefit. Another
definition, found in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, is inducement to wrong by bribery
or other unlawful or improper means.
Three requirements must be fulfilled if an act carried out by a civI1 servant is to be defined as
corrption (Tanzi, 1995:167-168):
. First, the act must be intentional and in conflct with the principle of objectivity in labour
performance. This implies that the rule that is broken is precise and transparent.
. Second, the person who breaks the rule must derive some recognisable benefit for
himself, his family, his frends, his tribe or party, or some other relevant group.
. Third, the benefit derived must be seen as a direct retum from the specific act of
"corrption" .
For our pUl-pose, focusing on fiscal corrption, it may be convenient to settle for a rather
specific two-part definition, one for taxpayers and the other for collectors (Low, 1995):
1. Tax collectors are corrpt when they use conferred monopoly power to extort money
from taxpayers, or collude with taxpayers in defrauding the treasury, or find some other
means of embezzling money from the tax authorities.
2. Taxpayers evade taxes when they intentionally faI1 to dec1are taxable economic activity
or use false declarations, with or without collusion from tax collectors.
In accordance with the definition above, tax evasion is an illegal activity, although the
economic activity that may have generated the tax liability in the first place need not be
ilegaL. Tax evasion should therefore be distinguished from fax avoidance, which is the
legitimate use of tax loopholes to reduce or minimise tax liability. The boundaries between
evasion and avoidance may, however, at times be vague (Pyle, 1993:59). To make a
distinetion between them for analytical purposes, Cowell (1985) has suggested that the
essential difference is that avoidance implies certainty on the part of the taxpayer, whereas
evasion involves risk.
3 Ineentive problems in tax administration
3.1 Introduction
A public institution or department must co-ordinate the activities of its constituent parts to be
successful. Effective co-ordination is, however, problematic when the different activities are
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managed by individuals whose primary concern is personal gain, not the success of the
institution. Incentive problems in the public sector are related to three matters (Campbell,
1995; Hirshleifer et aL., 1992; Kreps, 1990). The first has to do with conflcts of interest or
divergent objectives between the superiors (management) and the executives. The second
matter has to do with the fact that the executives often possess relevant information which
their superiors lack. The third matter is related to the difficulties of establishing incentive
systems that foster the institution's goals. Imperfect information and divergent motivations
between the actors involved lie at the core ofunderstanding these problems.
Divergent motivations open up the door to strategi c behaviour where agents are pursuing
their personal self-interests, and not the objectives of the institution. This is particularly a
problem when information is asymmetri c across individuals. Such informational
asymmetries may be significant in tax administration. For example, tax collectors are of ten
better informed about the revenue potential of a tax base than is the top management of the
treasury. Tax collectors may thus have incentives to exploit these informational advantages
to their own personal gain, whereas the management has incentives to encourage tax
collectors to reveal truthfully their knowledge of the revenue potential. By the same token,
taxpayers may have informational advantages over tax collectors conceming their tax
liability.
3.2 Principals and agents
We will use a principal-agent-client (P-A-C) framework as a point of departure for the
analysis (Klitgaard, 1988).3 This model focuses on the relationship between the principal, in
this case the governent or the top leve! of the local tax administration, an agent, i.e., the tax
administrator or collector, and a client, i.e., the taxpayer (see figure 3.1).4 The tax collector
(inter)acts as an agent (A) on behalf of the principal (P) with the taxpayer (C). Within this
theoretical framework we assume that tax collectors (A) and taxpayers (C) are motivated by
narrow self-interest,5 This implies that their decision to behave honestly or illicitly are based
on calculations of potential personal gains and losses that may result from their behaviour.
As a starting point we will assume that the principal's objective is to raise a given amount of
tax revenue while keeping the social cost of raising revenue at a minimum level. 6 We do not
consider other targets of taxation, such as horizontal equity and the redistribution of income.
3This approach bui/ds on Becker (1968) and Becker and Stigler (1974).
4 In the tax administration, there are of course many agents and clients. In general, there are severalleveIs of agents, -
superiors and subordinates, supervisors, auditors, etc. Similarly, agents (collectors) may interact with a large number of
clients (taxpayers).
J In economics we would say they are "ratio 
nal utility maximisers ".6In the principal-agent literature which focuses on the public sector it is usually assumed that the principal embodies the
public interest, in other words, it is a highly principled principal. In section 7, we discuss this assumption. We argue that in
many public institutions, including tax administration, there are probably several principals who try to influence the action
of the agent (i.e., the tax collector) in diferent directions.
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Figure 3.1 A stylised tax administration within the principal-agent framework
~ Superior tax authorityl
top management
!
-- Supervisor/auditor
1
-- Tax collector
~ Taxpayer
~ Assumed to be honest
Honesf: Reports truthfully to
the principal when
corruption in tax collection is
detected
Corrupt: May accept
bribes from the agent
Honesf: Receives
salary with certainty
Corru/Jf:
(a) Not detected: Receives
salary and bribe
(b) Detected: Outcome will
depend on whether he is
detected by an honest or
a corrupt auditor
Honesf: Pays taxes in
accordance to the law
Dishonesf: Evades taxes
(outcome depends on
whether detected by honest
or corrupt tax collector)
As noted above, the core of the principal-agent-c1ient problem are divergent objectives and
asymmetric information between the actors involved. The principal understands this
fundamental asymmetry of objectives and information. However, the information problem
makes it diffcult for the principal to control the agent, along two dimensions: (1) adverse
seleetion; and (2) moral hazard (figure 3.2).
The problem of adverse selection has to do with the fact that the agent has hidden knowledge
prior to contracting with the principaL. The tax collector will, for instance, have more
knowledge about his own competence and qualifications, inc1uding honesty, than will the
principal who employs him. This problem arises because not all tax collectors ex ante can be
identified as being honest or dishonest. There are many indications that this is a real problem
in some institutions. In particular, tax administrations, immigration and harbour authorities
in developing countries seem to be exposed to the problem of attraeting dishonest agents. In
spite of poor salaries, it may be very attractive to work in these instItutions. For instance, in
the Tanzanian Daily News (April 27, 1996, p. 7) we find the following statement: "Some
Tanzanians today are wiling to take up any job for which they are paid below the not-so-
honourable poor man's salary of 15,000, - rTanzanian shilings J so long as there are
(promises or) prospects of making side income through theft and bribes". In the same artic1e
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the author refers to a story where he told his unc1e that he had stared to study journalism in
college. The unc1e looked "visibly disappointed and wondered why someone should waste
three years learning only how to become a scribe. He asked why I hadn 't become a
policeman or an immigration offcer or a customs offcial". Cases are also reported where
attractive jobs that provide opportunities for extra incomes through corrption are auctioned
off to the highest bidders. These examples illustrate that opportunities for extra incomes
through corrption may attraet potentially dishonest persons (opportunists ) to these
departments (inc1uding, the tax administration). Thus, the share of potential dishonest
persons in these departments may be significantly larger that the share of opportunists in the
rest of society.
The problem of moral hazard arises after contracting when the agent takes actions hidden or
unobserved by the principal. For instance, when the principal employs the agent to collect
taxes the agent will evidently be in a better position to know about any shirking or
opportunistie behaviour he chooses to engage in. Since the agents actions cannot be
observed without costly monitoring, the agent may take bribes and/or embezzle funds, or he
may put little effort into tax collection.
Figure 3.2 Problems of asymmetric information
Adverse selection:
~
~
-- C:tract ~-- Time
Moral hazard:
~ C:trct ~ -- -. ~Time Time
Thus, the principal's problem arises when, as is usually the case in the public sector, he has
poor knowledge about the agents type, either honest or dishonest, and poor information
about the agents (and the clients) activities, either productive or corrpt. The principal
cannot tell how much of the outcomes of tax collection he observes are due to the agents
activities on his behalf. After all, the agent has incentives to mislead the principal into
thinking he is working only on productive activities, never on corrpt ones. The tax
administration like any other bureaucracy is not subject to competition and can set its own
agenda, which (may) have nothing to do with the principal's (the governents) objective.
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Consequently, the principal faces two problems:
1. How to screen and detect opportunists before they are employed, i.e., how to solve the
problem of adverse seleetion?
2. If opportunists are employed, how to design an incentive scheme that makes them
choose to be ho nest
The first question is about recruItment procedures, while the second question focuses on how
potentially corrpt individuals (opportunists) make their decisions.
Ifthe requirements regarding skills and qualifications to ajob are low, and the monItoring of
applicants is poor, opportunists may easily enter the system (i.e., adverse seleetion).
Therefore, some kind of screening is needed to avoid recruiting opportunists. If the tax
administration (or any other department) is known to be COffipt, we will expect potential
corrpt individuals being attracted to the institution, and thereby contributing to a bad
composition of the staff. A change of the department s reputation may be achieved over time
by providing the employees with incentives to solve the problems of moral hazard (see
below). Wage policy may play an important role in this context.
The problem of moral hazard is related to the fact that a person's decision to behave in
eIther a corrpt or honest manner is made after he or she is employed. The principal has two
options - a carrot and a stick - to solve this problem: The carrot is to provide incentives for
honest behaviour. The stick is to increase the probability of being detected and punished.
Intensifying monitoring and controls of the agents can increase the probability of being
detected. Punishment may be in the form of dismissals, imprisonment and/or confiscation of
incomes and wealth that the agent has acquired through corrption. Thus, the principal may
influence the acts of the agents by changing the risk ofbehaving corrptly, and by increasing
the personal costs through reduced incomes and wealth if detected. However, it may be
expensive for the principal to tackle these problems. Before proceeding to discuss wage
incentives for tax collectors (section 5), we wI1 discuss more specifically the incentive
structures facing taxpayers (C) and tax collectors (A), respectively.
3.3 Factors infuencing the tax collector 's decisions
Principal-agent analysis may help to identify some key ingredients and characteristics of the
incentive problems in tax administration, inc1uding situations where collectors and taxpayers
collude to defraud the treasury. Thus, in the context of fiscal corrption both the taxpayer's
and the collector's perspective must be taken into consideration to identify the factors
impacting on compliance behaviour (Fjeldstad, 1996).
Regarding the taxpayer's (clients) behaviour, tax evasion is practised in different forms,
with or without the collusion of tax collectors. In the c1assical tax evasion model developed
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the taxpayer's decision to evade or not is based on
calculations of costs and benefits of his behaviour. The evasion gamble is based on the
taxpayer weighing the benefits from successful evasion against the risky prospect of
detection and punishment. The taxpayer's behaviour is influenced by factors such as the
difference between the amount of the tax that is to be paid wIthout evasion and the tax
payment wIth fraud (which determines the benefits of evasion), and the probability of
detection and the penalties for fraud (which determine the costs). The model prediets that if
detection is highly probable and penalties severe, people will become more compliant.7
7 This lormulation ol a taxpayer's decision about whether or not to evade is ol course over-simplifed, and a number ol
criticisms have been levelled against it. One limitation has to do with the use ol penalties applied to those evaders who get
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We assume that the tax collector (agent) wIl be corrpt, with or without the collusion of
taxpayers, when his expected net benefit from corrption exceeds the expected benefit from
behaving honestly. The variables driving the tax collector's decision are similar to those
affecting the taxpayer, i.e., the size of the potential gain, the likelihood of detection, and the
consequences of detection.
The interaction between taxpayers and tax collectors depends on their relative bargaining
powers and to what extent agreements between the two groups are reached. Thus, dep ending
on their bargaining power tax collectors will either participate in revenue fraud by splitting
unpaid taxes with taxpayers (collusion), or will simply appropriate the full amount of the tax
not handed over to the (local) governents treasury. The latter outcome arises in
circumstances where the taxpayer has zero bargaining power. A related situation is one
where tax collectors simply extort money from taxpayers, by overstating the realliability of
the taxpayer. The bargaining element is here based on the ignorance of the taxpayer, or on
his being intimidated by the tax collector. A third case, involving no consideration of
bargaining power, occurs when a tax collector embezzles tax revenues without any collusion
on the part of the taxpayer (see box 3.1). In this last case, the only requisite is that the tax
collector is dishonest, and has direct access to tax proceeds. This situation only occurs when
taxes are paid in cash or in some other easily negotiable financial instruments.
Collusion may also have impacts on the actors' probability ofbeing detected. However, on a
general basis we cannot ascertain in what direction probability is affected. For instance, we
would assume that the taxpayer's perceived probability ofbeing detected for evasion drops if
he can count on collusion from the tax collector. On the other hand, if the taxpayer and
collector fail to "reach an agreement", both run the risk that the other may reveal the
attempted fraud. Thus, in some cases collusion may decrease the actual probability of being
detected for both the taxpayer and the collector, while collusion may have the opposite effect
in other situations.
If the taxpayer has to collude with the collector and share the evaded taxes, the effective
amount paid by the taxpayer (i.e., the tax plus the bribe) may be higher compared to a
situation without collusion. On the other hand, if collusion reduces the probability of being
detected, a taxpayer may be tempted to indulge in greater fraud than he would consider in
the absenee of co-operation with the collector. The size of the bribe received by tax
collector, i.e., the value of monetary gain accruing from corrption wIl probably vary with
the tax rate. For example, it is reasonable to assume that evasion ofhigher taxes will require
larger bribes.
However, tax evasion and fiscal corrption may, as noted above, be carred out without any
collusion between taxpayers and collectors. A taxpayer may, for instance, try to evade taxes
without exercising the option of bribing a collector, and a collector may not need co-
operation from the taxpayer if he can carr out an independent fraud, or can extort a bribe
from the taxpayer. Finally, while the penalty rate is exogenous for the taxpayer, the higher
the penalty faced by the taxpayer when detected in evas ion, the better the opportunity for the
collector to bargain away fraudulent gains from the taxpayer.
eaught. Raising penalties is not a eostless way of ensuring eompliance. This means that the penalties aetually imposed may
difer signifeantly from those in the tax law. Another limitation is due to the faet that, aeeording to the theory, the taxpayers
know preeisely the aetual probability of being deteeted and the penalties they wil endure, and that they make a eost-benefit
ealeulation on this basis. However, the tax administration often keeps this information highly eonfidentiaL. For most
taxpayers, the probability of being deteeted is only a subjeetive parameter. The taxpayer's deeision to evade or not, is
therefore not based on the aetual probability, but on his perception of the probability of being deteeted (whieh may vary
signifeantly between individuals). Cowell (1990) provides an interesting review of the tax evasion literature.
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Box 3.1 A typology of fiscal corruption
Within the principal-agent-client framework (P-A-C) it may be useful to make a
distinetion between (1) external corruption which is essentially an A-C relationship, and
(2) internal corruption which basically is a P-A relation (see Klitgaard, 1988:50):
1. External corruption (A-C re1ation).
This takes two major forms:
1.1 Collusion.
Tax collectors and taxpayers collude to reduce tax liabilities.
1.2 Extortion.
Tax collectors (assessors) make individualjudgements on tax liability, and
threaten taxpayers with higher rates, preying on their ignorance or theIr
unwilingness to subject their cases to costly litigation.
2. Internal corruption (P-A relation).
There are three major forms:
2.1 Embezzlement.
Tax collectors and/or employees of the tax administration make offwith funds
collected.
2.2 Fraud.
Overprinting of tax stamps and labels.
2.3 Collusive auditors.
The tax collector (A) may bribe the auditor (8) into not revealing incriminating
information.
The ways in which corrption is carried out in practice varies between tax bases. This has
partly to do with opportunities, for instance, the method of collecting the tax.
Numerous variables are influencing the tax collector's decision to either behave honestly or
corrptly. Box 3.2 presents a list of some key factors (Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997:21).
Most of these fit neatly into the theoretical framework developed in section 3. In the
following sections we discuss some of these variables.
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Box 3.2 Factors impacting on fiscal corruption
I. Payment:
Salary.
Fringe benefits, pensions, allowances, other financial incentives.
2. ControIs:
2.a. Internal control:
Supervision and control systems.
Standards ofperformance for employees.
Recruitment and selection procedures for personneI.
Rules and procedures for tax collection and reporting.
2.b External control:
General auditor's independence and capacity.
Law and order tradition, checks and balances.
Public attitudes about corruption (e.g., public tolerance of corruption and the role of
civil society).
Information made available to the public (e.g., newspapers, media).
The judiciary system.
3. Statutory penalty:
The size ofpenalty (amount of fine, confiscation ofwealth, prison sentence).
Administrative sanctions.
4. Public sector regulations:
Govemmental regulations (e.g., licences, fees, the etc.).
The tax law and tax regulations (including tax bases, collection procedures and
transpareney).
Statutory tax rates.
5. Other factors:
Parliament and political institutions.
The bureaucratie structure.
Political and administrative leadership.
Concentration of economic power.
Education of civil servants.
Cultural and ethnical determinants (e.g., the role of social networks and family ties).
Development aid organisations.
4 Payment
What impacts have wage incentives on the performanee of tax collectors? A common
observation about the wages received by tax collectors in many developing countries is that
they are so low as to invite corrpt behaviour (Chand and Moene, 1997; Mookherjee, 1997).
This is also the case in Tanzania. During the 1970s and 1980s, there has been severe erosion
in the real wages and salaries of civI1 servants. Average salaries in the late 1980s, for
example, provided only one-fifth the purehasing power of the 1970s. Civil servants also
receive monetary allowances of, on average, 35 percent of wage remuneration. Allowances
differ significantly between the different categories of civI1 servants. The upper ranks of the
civil service, for instance, enjoy several in kind benefits, such as free ho us ing, telephone, and
transport. (World Bank, 1994). According to Mans (1994:378), the average civil servants
package ofwages and monetary allowances in the early 1990s covered only about 40 percent
of the expenses of a typical household. To say that civil servants cannot live on their wages
is not ametaphor, but a statement of fact. As civI1 servants do live, it means that they have
other sources of income in addition to their salaries. Other sources of income often inc1ude
income from their "shambas" (plot of land) or from a second or third job in the private
sector. 8 There is a streng presumption that corrption constitutes a third additional source of
income.
8 Long delays in salary payment add to this problem. More than one-month delays are not uncommon in local authorities in
Tanzania. In arecent survey covering tax collectors in two district councils, the majority of the respondents answered that
they survived on products and incomes from their plot of land (Fjeldstad and Semboja, I 999).
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In a survey on corrption in service deliveries in Tanzania, 78 percent of the respondents
mentioned low salaries of public service workers as being a major incentive to seeking and
accepting bribes (CIET International, 1996:24). One responded stated:
You may find someone having not received salary Jor at least three or Jour months. What do
you think he wil eat? He wil eat us!
Aneedotal evidence from other poor countries indicates the existence of pay structures where
the offcIal salary is well below the wages the tax collector could achieve in alternative
employment. However, since collectors receive excessive incomes from bribes there is
strong dernand for tax collector jobs. Tanzi (1995:174) reports, for example, that in an
African country, "...three years ago, the governent reduced the wages of customs officials
to zero for six months under the assumption that 'they could take care of themselves'."
Many scholars, including, Palmier (1983); Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983), and Klitgaard
(1988) seem to argue that increasing civil service wages will reduce corrption. The
implication here is that corrpt behaviour is induced by poor pay, and would therefore
reduce or disappear if incomes were to rise. The basic idea is that a rise in the tax collector's
salary is like an increase in his fine for bribery, sine e that is what he will lose if he is caught
and fired.
What does empirical evidence tell us about the relationship between public sector wages and
corrption? In a study that comprises 25 developing countries, Rijckeghem and Weder
(1997) find that corrption seems to be less in countries where bureaucrats are relatively well
paid compared to private sector employees. This relationship is illustrated in figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 The association between corruption and wages in the civil service
Relative
wage
level
Corrption
The figure shows that an increase in the public sector wage leve! relative to the best private
sector alternative may contribute to reduce corrption.9 However, in order to eliminate
9 Based on historieal data, Lindbeek (1998) argues that the low eorruption in Sweden during the period 1870-1970 partly
was due to the Jaet that high-level civil servants earned 12-15 times the salary oJ an average industrial worker. Many
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corrption very large increases in salaries are needed.1o Thus, fighting corrption only on the
basis of wage incentives may be extremely costly to the authorities, and will most likely
have limited impacts if not combined with other measures (Besley and MeLaren, 1993;
Tanzi, 1998). In circumstances with weak - or non-existent - auditing and monitoring
capacity, and pervasive propensity for corrption, the present low salary level in the local tax
administrations in Tanzania may actually be too high in the sense that even lower salaries
would not lead to increased corrption. Furthermore, if ei vil servants are paid a significantly
higher salary than their private sector alternatives, some people may be wiling to pay bribes
to be chosen for these public jobs. Thus, the high pay policy may create new types of
corrption (Wei, 1999).
5 Control and penalty
What impacts do controls and monitoring have on the collectors' performance? In addition
to wage incentives, the collector' s decision whether to behave honestly or corrptly depends
on the anticipated costs of the decision. Two variables matter: First, the probability of being
detected, and second, the size of the penalty. However, the behaviour of the bureaucrat does
not need to be influenced by a high probability of being detected if the penalty is
insignificant. Similarly, the size of the penalty may be unimportant ifthe probability ofbeing
detected is minimaL.
The expected costs of corrption are also influenced by the following factors:
. The possibility of getting a new job if detected and fired.
. The moral costs connected to corrption: There may be internalised moral costs
connected with corrption that mainly reflects the individual actor's personal view on
being involved in corrption. These costs are related to norms and what is considered to
be morally accepted. Typically, ifthe norm says that corrption is wrong the moral costs
will be high. This has partly to do with the public tolerance of corrption. However, the
dominating norm within the tax administration may diverge very much from the norm of
the broader society. Thus, we wil expect that the more widespread fiscal corrption is,
the lower are the internal moral costs connected with corrption.
. The stigma costs connected to corrption: This has to do with the possible importanee of
loosing ones good name if detected. Thus, stigma costs reflect one's perception of other
peoples' view of corrption, and may vary dep ending on the number of other tax
collectors involved in corruption. If a collector observes that many of his colleges are
corrpt, we may expect that the stigma costs connected with corrption are relatively
smalL.
. The extent of corrption in the department: This has, as discussed above, an impact on the
stigma costs, and also on the probability of being detected and the credibility of
penalties. In a highly corrupt department, a collector may just pay a bribe to the auditor if
detected.
The monitoring problem can also be thought of in terms of principal-agent relations (see
figure 3.1). For instance, given that the tax collector has private information about the
revenue potential of the specific tax base, he can report the tax revenues collected to be
scholars also attribute the low level of corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong to the relatively high salaries of senior
bureaucrats and politicians (Wei, 1999).
io Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) estiniate, for instance, that to reduce the corruption level in Ghana and Colombia to the
low Singapore level, ane needs to raise the public sector's pay by 975 percent and 660 percent, respectively.
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lower than what is actually the case. The tax collector could c1aim that a low tax yield is due
to exogenous factors, e.g., poor weather conditions, or low capacity in the tax administration,
problems of transport, etc., when they really are due to embezzlement. In order to limit this
information asymmetry (and the potential rent extracted by the tax collector), the principal
can hire an auditor. 11
The role of the auditor is to reveal the tre leve! of taxes collected for the principal. Thus, the
goal of the monitoring policy is to identify and report tax fraud. If corrpt collectors are
caught they are fired. Hiring an auditor, however, does not automatically solve the problem.
The problem for the tax authorities (the principal) is that the auditor is diffcult to control,
along two dimensions:
. The auditor may simply not work very hard to find violations (low effort).
. The auditor may, on revealing fraud, fail to report and offer to take a bribe from the tax
collector instead (collusion).
These are both problems of moral hazard (see section 3.2). The problem of collusion can to
some extent be dealt with by engaging an (external) auditor to audit the (internal) auditor
("hawk over hawk"). Thus, the principal may, with some probability, catch the (internal)
auditor in the act of taking a bribe, and can fire him in that case. However, the problem of
low effort cannot be detected through control mechanisms, sine e the principal cannot
observe how hard the auditor is working. The solution for the principal is to design an
incentive scheme that stimulates effort. However, a pure wage solution for auditors has its
limitations in reducing corrption. For payment to influence effort, payment must be related
to the fulfiment of certain goals, in this case to detect and report fraud. Thus, a bonus system
linked to the number of fraudulent cases reported to the principal may provide the auditors
with the right incentives. The reward (or bonus) to the auditor detecting fraud must,
however, match the potential bribe from the tax collector. In a situation where bribes are
very large, this may therefore result in a very expensive monitoring system.
The main point with the discussion above is that the implementation of monitoring contracts
is sensitive to strategi c behaviour from the paries involved. In summary, lack of effective
controls facilitates corrption, and monitoring systems may also be part of the corrption
structures within tax departments. What is the situation in local authorities in Tanzania?
Financial control is, in principle, exercised through several mechanisms, generally grouped
into internal and external. Internally, the revenue (finance) department of the council is
responsible for the "daily" accounting work, inc1uding control. External audit is to be done
by the Auditor General's office. In 1995, Semboja (1995) reports that the audit section in
Kilosa District Council (DC) had not yet been established. However, through a regional
arrangement, councils in the region shared an intern al auditor who is stationed in Morogoro
Municipal Council, but he has not been in Kilosa "sinee the beginning of the year due to
poor health". By July 1997, internal auditing was still not carred out in Kilosa DC (Fjeldstad
and Semboja, 1999). Furthermore, the external Offce of Controller and Auditor General is
in general understaffed, and has little capacity to undertake comprehensive audits because of
severe shortage of qualified and trained staff, especially at the senior professional levels
11 Apaper that carries a lot of insight into the problem of monitoring is Mookherjee and Png (1995). The paper studies the
optimal incentive arrangement for a bureaucracy in which apollution inspector must monitor a firm for compliance with
po/lution regulations. The insights of the model can, however, be applied directly to the monitoring (and auditing) problem
in tax administration if the word "compliance" is taken to mean compliance with the tax law instead of with pollution
regulations.
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(Sedigh and Muganda, 1999).12 Thus, in practice there are no auditing and control
mechanisms in place. The effciency and effectiveness of monitoring and audi ting devices
may vary between councils, however, the Kilosa-case probably reflects the situation in many
local authorities in Tanzania.
The situation described above for local authorities in Tanzania previously also characterised
the central governent tax administration.13 A study of the Customs Department in 1996
reports that internal auditing and inspections functions had become for the most part non-
operative and ineffective (Cunningham, 1996). For instance, the permanent staffin Customs
in early 1996 consisted of only 4 staff at the headquarters leve1 and only 5 in the entire Dar
es Salaam zone where approximately 80 percent of all customs revenues in Tanzania are
collected. Therefore, the responsibility for internal operational audits had been assumed by
extemal auditors from the Auditor General's (AG) office. However, 6 or 7 auditors from the
AG's offce was stationed for extended periods at the Customs office, thereby becoming
"part of the system and the peer network" to be inspected (Cuningham, 1996:66). This
situation eliminated the independence of the audi ting units, opened up for collusion, and
reduced the risk for collectors to participate in fraud.
6 Public sector regulations and the tax system
What impacts do public sector regulations have on the incidenee of corrption? Some studies
argue that a country characterised by large governent involvement is more likely to
experience high levels of corrption (Tanzi, 1994). The basic argument is that the more
governents intervene in the economy, the more opportunities for discretionary
interpretation of regulations and allocation of resources by civil servants. However, the
public sector is extensive in some of the least corrpt countries such as Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. At the same time corrption seems to have increased in
some countries, including China, Russia and Tanzania, that have gone through economic
liberalisation and privatised public companies. According to the Commission on Corrption
in Tanzania (UT, 1996), economic liberalIsation has significantly contributed to increase
corrption in the country by facilitating new opportunities for culprits. Thus, empirical
evidence indicates that it is not the size of the public sector, but the way the public sector
works that are of importanee for the leve1 of corrption.
In particular, this seems to be the case in the context of fiscal corrption. For example, the
local government tax system in Tanzania is characterised by:
1. An excessive number of different taxes with different rate structures that are difficult
for taxpayers to understand. 
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12 According to Sedigh and Muganda (1999: 167), the Auditor Generals Offce has been hindered by financial constraints
and its inability to attraet, train or keep suitable staff since the private sector is offering more rewarding employment to
professionals./3 In 1996, the central government tax administration was completely reorganised, and Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)
was established.
14 Furthermore, large variations exist between the tax structures oflocal authorities. In 1997,for instance, there were more
than 60 types of revenue sources being levied in Kilosa District Council (Morogoro Region), compared to at least 25 in
Kibaha DC (Coastal Region), and about 50 revenue sources in Dar es Salaam City Commission. These figures do,
however, not take into account the various sub-groups of particular revenue bases. For instance, in Kilosa DC trade licenee
and weight and measure fee had 9 components each. In Kibaha DC business licenee had 8 components and bu ilding
inspection fe es had 5 main components and 12 sub-groups (including inspection fees for the diferent components of a
bu ilding such as foundation, roofing, walls, finishing and occupation). The by-law on hawking and street trading in Kibaha
DC from 1991, specifes in detail 38 diferent components (including licences for bicycle repairs, t yre puncture repairs,
shoe shiner, car wash, carpenter, firewood, potato chips seller Iicenses, etc.) The number of rates applied on individual
revenue components are also high.
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2. The tax law is written in a confusing way and manuals to consult are often absent,
opening up for discretionary powers by tax enforcers.
3. Tax offcials have discretion over important decisions, such as those related to the
provision of tax exemptions, determination of tax liabilities, selection of audits,
litigation, etc..
4. Many administrative procedures, including the procedures for reporting tax revenues,
lack transparency and are poorly monitored both within the tax administration and by
the Auditor General's Offce.
5. Weakness of legal sanctions to enforce punishments on either taxpayers or collectors
who do not comply with the law.
6. Most taxes are paid in cash by individuals to tax collectors.
Each of these factors contributes to a non-transparent and complicated tax system, where
taxpayers' are left to the discretionary power of collectors. Furthermore, the offcial wages
of tax officials are low (section 4), and acts of corrption are not easily discovered due to
inefficient auditing and monitoring (section 5 and 6).
7 Bureaucratie and poliical structures
7.1 Introduction
What impacts does the institutional set-up of local authorities have on the incidenee of
corrption? In the principal-agent model discussed in previous sections, we assumed one
principal represented by the top level of the local authority (or tax administration), whose
objective is to raise a given amount of tax revenue while keeping the social cost of raising
revenue at a minimum level (see section 3 above).15 In other words, we assume a highly
principled principal who is representing the public interest (Klitgaard, 1988). Thus, we
implicitly assume that the principal is committed to systemic reform, improvements in tax
collection effciency and greater integrity in the local tax administration. Do these
assumptions reflect reality? There are (at least) two objections to this assumption. First, there
may be several principals involved each with incoherent objectives and interests. Second, the
principal may also be corrpt and not acting in the interests of the society but pursuing his
own narrow self-interests.
7.2 Multiple principals
Local authorities in Tanzania are characterised by several (multiple) principals. The local tax
administration is organised in a three-Iayer hierarchy: vilage - ward - council headquarters
(see figure 7.1).16 This institutional structure is characterised by at least three principals at
the top leve!: (i) the administrative leadership (management team) of the local authority, (ii)
local politicians and (iii) the central governent administration (i.e., Ministry of Local
Governent). Furhermore, development aid organisations are heavily involved in district
development programmes in some local authorities, and may have significant influence
there. Independent of each other these principals try to influence the revenue target and, thus,
the actions of the tax collectors (the agents). Based on evidence from fieldwork, we present
the following propositions about the principals' objectives:17
15 Alternatively, the principal's objective could be to maximise tax revenues subject to the constraints laid by the tax law.
16In rural councils, below the vilage level a additional structure exists named "kitongoji". The corresponding sub-level in
urban counciIs is called "mtaa ". The role of these sub-levels with respect to taxalion is mainly to mobilise taxpayers.
/7 See Fjeldstad and Semboja (J 999) for detaiIs.
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(i) The objective of the top management of the local authority (the administrative leadership)
is to generate enough tax revenues to pay the wage bill and allowances of the staff. This
target seems to be a minimum performanee requirement from the central governent, but
are, in general, far below the revenue potential.
(ii) The objective of local politicians is to get re-elected (and sometimes also to achieve
sitting allowances when participating in council meetings). Politicians may say they want an
effcient tax administration, - but only to the point at which voters begin complaining that
they are being harassed. 18 Fj eldstad and Semboj a (1999) find that some councils experience
revenue shortfalls in election years. They relate this drop to politicians preaching "voluntary
tax payment" and instrueting tax collectors "not to harass" taxpayers.
(iii) The objective of the central government administration19 seems somewhat unclear in the
context of taxation. However, a short-term objective is that the council generates enough
revenues to cover its wage bilL. The long-term objective may be to maximise tax revenues
subject to the constraints laid by the tax law.
The objective of donor agencies in this context seems to be to maximise tax revenues, since
this is us ed as a quantitative indicator of the performanee of the councils they are involved
m.
Social networks further complicate the picture outlined above. In societies where family-,
tribal- and ethnical relations are strong and important, it is expected that civil servants
provide services to these. In many local authorities in Tanzania tax collectors at the village
and ward levels are recruited from the local communities. Traditional networks may impose
heavy constraints on the collector's (the agents) actions, for instanee on who is to be
exempted from paying taxes (see section 6). Thus, same clients (taxpayers) may act as
principals. This implies that tax collectors can be both agents and clients, dep ending on
circumstances. Once civil servants begin to make distinetions among people they deal with
according to the degree of family relationship or friendship, they have abandoned the arm's-
length principle (i.e., the principle of objectivity). This principle requires that personal or
other relationships should play no rele in economic decisions that involve more than one
party (see section 2).
18 Wilson (1989:174) also discusses the role ofpoliticians in connection with revenue collection.
19 The Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government.
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Figure 7.1 The institutional set-up for local government tax collection in Tanzania
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Source: Fjeldstad and Semboja (1999)
l. At the council headquarters the responsibility rests with the council treasury, headed by the District
Treasurer (DT). Here, two major groups of staff exist, namely revenue collectors (DRC) and inspectors (DRI).
The first is responsible for the revenues collected at the council headquarters and the sub-district levels, i.e., the
ward and vilage levels. The second group forms the inspectorate that is the audit and investigation wing of
revenue collection.
2. At the ward leveis, the reSponsibility for tax collection rests with the office of the
Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The WEO als o handles and order functions at that level. For this purose the
local militia are to their disposal. In larger wards which may possess greater revenue potential there wil also be
a ward revenue collector (WRC) to spearhead revenue collection in the ward.
3. At the vilage lev el, the responsibility rests with the office of the vilage executive
offcer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for vilage developmental issues. The vilage executive officers
are nominated to their position by the vilage governents, but appointed and employed by the counciL. The
system ofnomination ensures that the VEOs have to come from the vilages. Many of the existing VEOs are
the previous vilage CCM (party) secretaries. At the sub-vilage lev el the kitongoji leader shall assist in
mobilising taxpayers.
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The discussion above shows that tax collectors (agents) may receive different and often
contradictory messages and expectations from their principals. Empirically, it may prove
difficult to test the importanee of several principals in the context of fiscal corrption in local
authorities. However, what we do observe is that the principals faIl to co-ordinate their
strategi es, either because they do not observe the same variables, or because they cannot
commit to collaborate. The effect is severe weakening of the power of the incentive schemes
provided to the agents (i.e., the tax collectors). The more the principals' interests diverge, the
more room for the agents' diseretion, and the less effective monitoring and control of the
agents. Thus, by identifying the "principals" involved in setting the target(s) for revenue
mobilisation, we may get an indication on the severity of this problem. In addition, this
approach may also contribute in explaining why corrption (and collusion) is more pervasive in
.. h h 20some organisations t an ot ers. .
7.3 Corrupt principals
The political and administrative leaders may themselves be corrpt. Principals may on the one
hand take initiatives to curb corrption, whIle on the other hand being involved in wholesale
corrption (Galtung, 1998). For instance, the Tanzanian "Commission on Corrption" (URT,
1996) argues (p. 70) that the greatest source of corrption in the country is the laxity of
leadership in overseeing the implementation of established norms. According to the report (p.
1 1) there is no questioning to the fact that the country' s leadership is being accused in acts of
corrption: "Some of the candidates who were associated with corrupt practices have
succeeded and are presently Councillors; members of the House of Representatives; and
Members of Parliament. Because such leaders got their position through corruption, it is not
easy to expect them to be good examples of good leadership". In general, we will expect corrpt
leaders to lower the moral and stigma costs connected with corrption. Furthermore, corrpt
principals may to some extent not bother about corrption at lower levels in the public sector.
An extreme position taken in this context refers to the late President Mobuto Sese Seko who
provided the following advise to Zairian civIl servants "if you want to steal, steal a liUle in a
nice way. But if you steal so much that you become rich overnight, you 'll be caught. ,,21 In these
circumstances we wil expect that the generalIevel of corrption in the institution and/or
society is high, and the risk ofbeing involved in corrption to be low.
7.4 The tax administration as a multiprincipal, multtask agency
The principal-agent-client model of fiscal corrption presented in section 3.2 (see figure 3.1)
needs to be extended to account for the roles of all key stakeholders in the tax enforcement
proeess. Fjeldstad and Semboja (1999) argue that there are notable differences between the
institutional arrangements of tax collection and tax design in local authorities in Tanzania.
However, in practice, the demarcations between the institutional environment of the two distinet
activities are not as clear as they might appear (see table 7.1).
Furthermore, the stakeholders involved in local tax design reinforce the variations observed
between councIls (see section 6). In particular, the emphasis by local politicians on equity
considerations has led to a fine-tuning of the tax structure in those councils where politicians
have the power to influence tax design. Thus, the present complicated and non-transparent local
revenue structure are partlya result of the different interests of the stakeholders involved in tax
20 Wilson (1989) and Dixit (1996) provide convincing arguments on the importance of multiple principals to understand
incentive problems in organisations.
21Quotedfrom Sandbrook (1986:95).
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design, and partlya consequence of the local authorities' and the central governent' s inability
to understand the financial, economic and social implications of the local tax system.
Table 7.1 The stakeholders' roles in tax design and collection
The stakeholders The stakeholders ' Degree of involvement in
various roles
Tax desifln Tax collection
l. District management team P/Ai Direct and significant Direct and significant
(DMT, inc! DT)
2. Local government politicians P/A/C2 Direct, sometimes significant Indirect (mobilisation),
sometimes significant
3.Bureaucrats at the ministry P3 Direct, in general, Indirect
level insignificant
4. Central government P4 Indirect, insignificant Indirect, sometimes
¡Joliicians significant
5.Donors Pj Indirect, insignificant Indirect, sometimes
significant
6. Tax collectors at the sub- AlCó Indirect, in general, Direct and significant
district level (WEG/WRC and insignificant
VEG)
7. Taxpayers, inc! social C/P7 Indirect, insignificant Direct, sometimes
networks significant
In table 7.1, Pi is a principal corresponding to the standard principal-agent model discussed in
section 3, with the power to define and influence both Its relationship to agents (tax collectors)
and clients (taxpayers). However, Pi (for instanee the District Treasurer) can also become an
agent (Az) by assuming this role ilicitly and embezzle tax revenues. Local politicians may act
as principals (Pz) by influencing their relationships to tax collectors and taxpayers, but may also
become agents (Az) involved in corrption, as well as clients (Cz) for groups oftaxpayers/social
networks (P7). Correspondingly, tax collectors are agents (A6), who in some contexts are clients
(C6) to taxpayers/social networks (P7).
8 Empirical findings from Tanzania22
Fiscal corrption is extensive in local authorities. It takes many forms and vares by types of
taxes, methods oftax collection and location. It cuts across all levels of the local authority, from
the vilage to the district council headquarters (see figure 7.1). The magnitude of corrption in
terms of the amounts of money involved seems to rise by the administrative leve! of the
counciL.
Although many cases of collusion between taxpayers and collectors are reported, the most
common type of corrption found is embezzlement ofrevenues by tax collectors (see box 3.1).Z3
22 This section is based on Fjeldstad and Semboja (1999).
23 Fjeldstad and Semboja (1999) report several cases of collusion. For instance, in 1995 three Vilage Executive Offcers in
Kibaha DC (Bakomnemela vilage in Soga ward; Mwendapole vilage in Kibaha ward; and Twendepamoja village in Tumbi
ward) werefired due to dubious deals with taxpayers on cashew cess. In this case, no receipts were issued, and TSh 1,000,000
was evaded. The incident was discovered by accident and reported by an offcialfrom the District Treasury Offce. In Kilosa
DC in 1996, L O ward revenue collectors and seven militiamen were retrenched due to mismanagement of funds.
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Embezzlement is the form of tax revenues, which does not accrue to the accounts of local
governents, but is siphoned off by tax collectors and administrators (Prud' homme, 1992).
This indicates that taxpayers have low bargaining power (section 3.3), as we would expect in a
situation where taxpayers' are left to the discretionary powers of collectors and the control
(monitoring) of tax collectors is weak. By definition the amount of embezzlement is not
recorded.
Embezzlement can be assumed on the basis of five observations:
. the level ofwages makes it necessary (section 4);
. the lack of controls makes it possible (section 5);
. the nature of the tax system is astrong inducement to it (section 6); and
. the administrative and political structures undermine the power of incentive schemes
(section 7).
Furthermore, the general public has is practice not access to offcial records on tax revenues and
public expenditures.
The mechanisms and scope of corrption in the local tax administrations can be illustrated by a
few cases:
Most taxes are collected in the form of cash. The collector is supposed to deliver a receipt of a
standard form to the taxpayer, a copy (counterfoil) of which is retained by his superiors to be
audited. In principle, the tax collector is required to retum the old receipt books showing used
counterfoils and unutilised receipts for audit so as to control their use before receiving new
ones. In practice, however, this procedure is often not followed. In one local authority, for
instance, evidence was found that large numbers of tax receipt counterfoils were not retued to
the council headquarters as required by the financial regulations.24 It is reasonable to assume that
the counterfoils not retured are us ed to embezzle tax revenues. A note from the distrct chief
executive supported this proposition.
For the development levy (a head tax that is one of the major local governent tax bases in
Tanzania), the amount embezzled in this way in 1995 corresponded to more than 35 percent of the
council's actual revenues from the levy. The corresponding figue for 1996 was about 15 percent.
It is not possible to estImate the amount embezzled for other categories of taxes such as crop cess,
livestock cess and market fees, since the receipts issued wI1 var from one trans action to the other,
dep ending on the specific tax item, rates and units. However, for 1995 more than 30 percent of the
receipt books issued for such taxes were not retued.25
Thus, in practice, these receipts are often not available (by neglect or purpose), and when they
are utilised, they can easily be modified. One well-known method of stealing money paid in by
taxpayers is through the use of the carbon shipping system (see, for instance, URT, 1996:318;
and TCCIA, 1995). The taxpayer is given a receipt showing the amount paid. Since no carbon
paper is put under the original receipt in the proeess of writing, the collector later enters a lesser
figure on the copy and pockets the difference. Another method used by collectors is to write
receipts noting a lower amount than the amount paid by the taxpayer. Collectors may use this
24 fn this particular council, in total, 771 receipt books were not returned in the period 6 January 1995 to 26 February 1997.
The number of receipts in each book varied from 50 to 150, depending on the type of tax.
25 A large number of the missing books were issued to the District Revenue fnspector (DRf) and the District Accountant (DRA),
both based at the district headquarter. The DRf is responsible for con trollng and inspecting collectors at lower leveIs. fn the
two-year period from January 1995, the DRf had not returned 126 receipt books. The corresponding figure for the DRA was
114 books. They continued to receive new receipt books in spile of the fact of not ha ving returned previously issued books.
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method when dealing with taxpayers that cannot read or wrIte. In other cases, the carbon paper
is placed in such away that the counterfeIt only registers a part of the figure on the taxpayer's
receipt, for instance, omitting same zeros.
In another case, whIch we followed over a period of three months in 1997, evidence was found
that only a small share of the maize cess collected at a maize market actually was reported to the
counciL. Maize is the major cessable crop in this counciL. Sellers and buyers meet at a
designated area close to the main road allocated to this purpose. The cess is collected by the
ward offcers (see figure 7.1) from the buyers at the market area. According to the collectors, the
maize cess is easy to collect. By comparing the amount of cess collected, with the revenues
reported in the accounts of the district treasury for the same period, we found that less than 5
percent of the cess was actually report ed, or to put it differently more than 95 percent of the
revenues were embezzled.26
Embezzlement may also take place through collusion between staff of the council's treasur
deparment and bank offcials, leading to the non-bankng oftax revenues. Recently, one such case
was brought to court, involving several staff members of the council's revenue deparment. The
amount embezzled in thIs specific case during the first 6 months of 1997, corresponded to 10
percent of the total revenues reported to the council treasury in 1996. In early 1998, the Controller
and Auditor General uncovered cases from 31 councils where cashbook -receipts were not reflected
in the bank statements (see appendix 2). This kind of corrption is carred out in collaboration
with bank officials who issue a receipt on the correct amount to the treasury offcial. The
receipt is brought back to the council revenue office for control, and is consistent wIth the
money remItted. However, only a part of the tax revenues is actually deposited into the
council' s account. The rest is shared between the bank officials and the collectors involved.
This method may be sustained over time since what actually is deposited in the council' s bank
account is rare ly controlled. 27
We should, of course, be cautious when generalising on the basis of the cases referred to above.
They are specific for the councils studied. However, a surey of newspaper articles on corrption
in local authorities (appendix 2is and other sureys indicate that corrption is an extensive
problem. 29 Furthermore, embezzlement seems to be the major form of corrption.
26 During the visits to the market, the number ol maize bags loaded on to lorries and the presence ol the collectors were
recorded. In 1997, the cess was TSh 200 per bag à 100 kg.
27 In the case reIerred to above, the embezzlement-network was revealed when a new treasurer took over and started internal
contraIs.
28 The survey covers the period March 1998 to January 1999. To collect this inlormation we engaged a person to read through
as many Tanzanian newspapers as possible (both daily and weekly newspapers, in English and Swahili). Due to other
obligations same newspapers were not read in periods. Thus, it is lair to say that the newspaper reparts provide a picture ol the
situation, although they most likely underestimate the extent ol corruption revealed.
29 For instance, one survey investigated the extent ol corruption in public services (CIETInternational, 1996). The survey was
undertaken in 40 communities in 10 district councils in Tanzania. A questionnaire covering 120 households in each site was
carried out. In addition, key inlormants were interviewed and locus group discussions about experiences ol corruption in public
services were held. The survey confirmed the widely held beliel that corruption is common in the delivery alpalice, judiciary,
revenue and lands services. The survey data indicated that around a third of recent users ol the lour services had to pay, on
request Irom the civil servant, a bribe in order to get service. Long delays in service were reported, together with laele ol uselul
inlormation about the service. Such payments are aften reIerred to as Hkitu kidogo H (Hsomething small H) or "chai" (Htea
money"), or sometimes "lunch allowances"or were said to be lor Hstationary to open the file H. The Hcheapest" service was the
police, and the most expensive ane the lands service. Furthermore, 153 civil servants employed in the lour services in 10
district councils were interviewed. They were askedIor their views about the leve! ol corruption in public services. More than
half ol them (57 percent) thought there was "very much" corruption in public services. This proportion corresponds to the
Tanzania average of 60 percent ol the surveyed households who thought corruption in public services was "very much". About
two thirds ol the civil servants interviewed thought corruption had worsened in the last five years.
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Prolonged embezzlement of large amounts of tax revenues requires the involvement of relevant
senior offcials from the councIls' headquarers. In one council evidence was found of a corrption
network involving the head of district treasury, the district revenue inspectors, the district
accountant and ward executive offcers. The prolonged existence and performanee of such
corrption networks requires that:
(i) the tax collectors and tax inspectors are stationed relatively permanently in their
positions, i.e., they are rarely transferred;
(ii) the network is limited to a relatively small number of people in the tax
administration; and
(iii) taxpayers are not directly involved.
The exclusion of taxpayers from the embezzlement corrption network is possible because the
tax collectors may provide genuine receipts to taxpayers on taxes paid. In some cases two sets
of simIlar receipt books are used.3o
9 How corruption may corrupt
Why do corrption levels vary across local authorities? The principal-agent-client approach
presented in previous sections may contribute to explain some of the fundamental incentive
problems that arise due to imperfect information. However, it has (at least) two limitations:
First, in situations where the tax bases, the collection and audi ting devices are apparently
similar, as is the case in many councIls in Tanzania, how do we explain the observed variations
in corrption levels between councIls? Second, the actuallevels of audit and penalty rates if
detected are set at such low levels or are almost non-existent, that, following the standard
approach we would expect that most tax collectors would be corrpt if they pursued their self-
interests in a rational (consistent) manner, because of the low probability of being detected and
penalised. It seems that while the odds are heavily in favour of collectors getting away with it,
surprisingly many behave honestly. It therefore appears that there is some discrepancy between
the way in which tax collectors actually decide to report tax revenues collected and the models
that have been used by economists to explain this behaviour.
One possible explanation why different corrption levels may arise is that "corrption
corrpts". Thus, the expected profitabIlity of engaging in a fraudulent transaction compared to
not engaging in it hinges upon the number of other people doing it. In other words, the
compliance of each depends on the compliance of others. 31 Therefore, similar incentive systems
(and institutions) may lead to different levels of corrption. Differences in the corrption levels
of tax departments in various local authorities may be explained by them having settled in
various "equIlibria", for instanee a "high-corrption" equilibrium and a "low-corruption"
equilibrium. An equilibrium is established where the individual actor has no incentive to change
his behaviour.
30 White embezzlement seems to be the major mechanism offiscal corruption in local authorities in Tanzania, collusion between
taxpayers (importers) and collectors seems to be the major mechanism in Customs. Fjeldstad (1999) argues that this has to do
with the bargaining power between importers and customs offcials, and theiT mutual interest in maintaining long term
relations (see section 3.3).
31 In principle, this can be interpreted as a collective action problem, in the way that the individual's decision is dependent on
the actions of others.
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The basic idea us ed by economists to explain variations in corrption 1eve1s is ilustrated
in figure 9.1 (see Andvig and Moene, 1990; Andvig, 1993; and Bardhan, 1997).32 The number
of corrpt tax collectors is measured from 1eft to right a10ng the horizontal axis of the diagram.
Each point along the horizonta1 axis indicates a given distribution of tax collectors between the
corrpt and non-corrpt category. The payoff (profit or "utility") of the trans action is measured
a10ng the vertica1 axis. Non-economic variables such as feeling of guilt, fear of loss of
reputation (stigma) or actual punishment are incorporated into the tax collector's payoff (utility)
function. The two lines Corrupt and Honest then describe the payoff for a potentia1 corrpt,
respectively honest collector for all possib1e allocations of the remaining ones between the two
categories. The Honest cure is fallng throughout the whole area, reflecting the payoff for a
comp1ete1y honest tax collector in a tax administration with increasing corrption. The payoff
for an honest collector is larger than the payoff for a corrpt one when the number of corrpt
collectors is 10w (to the 1eft of point B). The Corrupt-curve has a turning point in D: As the
number of corrpt collectors is rising, corrption becomes less scarce and bribe-paying
taxpayers may on1y be wiling to pay a lesser bribe for a given corrpt favour (to the right of
point D).33 Furthermore, the way the figure is drawn assumes that corrption has negative
welfare consequences in the sense that everybody is better off in A than in C (although
corrption may increase we1fare in a restricted area of corrption 1evels).
32Thisfigure is often referred to as a Schellng diagram (Schellng, 1973:388).
33The "Corrnpt curve" in figure 9 refers to a situation with collusion between taxpayers and collectors (i. e., bribery). However,
in cases where embezzlement of tax revenuesby collectors are the most common type of corrnption (see section 8), the curve
may have a diferent form. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Corrupt curve stil has a turning point (such as D)
since the amount embezzled per tax collector (and, thus, the payofJ will be less the larger the number of corrnpt offcials
nvolved.
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Figure 9.1. Multiple corruption equilibria
Payoff
A
c
n
.. .
Less corrption More corruption
Source: Andvig (1993)
In the figure, the payoff for the potential corrpt tax collector (Corrupt) increases throughout
the area to the left of point D. There are at least three arguments supporting an increasing
Corrupt-curve:
1. Eventual internalised moral feelings of guilt by fraudulent behaviour decrease as the
number of corrpt tax offcials increases.
2. When many others are involved in corrption, the loss of reputation (stigma) for each
collector when discovered is likely to decrease.
3. When many others are corrpt, this lowers the probability of being revealed, due to the
fact that the capacity of intern al and external investigation units may be strained.
There are three equilibrium points in the figure: A, B and C. Why are these equlibria? At A all
are honest, and wil prefer to stay that way since their utility levels are above that of any tax
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collector who tries the corrpt option. Hence, the tax administration will stay in the "c1ean"
position. At C all are corrpt sine e it will not "pay" to be honest. At B, any given tax collector
is indifferent between the corrpt and the non-corrpt strategy. The major difference between
these equilibria is that A and C are stable, while B is unstable. The reason why B is unstable is
that if one more person is becoming corrpt, then it will pay to become corrpt. However, if
only one less person is corrpt, the last collector will choose to become non-corrpt too. Thus,
if the tax administration starts out with higher corrption levels than B (for some historie al
reason), it will move towards the stable high equilibrium leve! at point C. However, if it starts
offwith a lower leve! than B it wil end up at point A.
This theoretical approach may thus contribute in explaining several observed phenomena of
corrption in local authorities:
. We may observe widely different levels of corrption with the same tax structure, collection
system, monitoring and auditing mechanisms.
. Small changes in the number of corrpt agents may have huge effects on the corrption level
iftax administration initially is located at a point c10se to B: If a short-lived, but strong anti-
corrption campaign is able to move the tax administration from C and beyond B the
administration will move by its own momentum to A. For instance, corrption in some local
authorities has been significantly reduced after the arrval of new district treasurers who
have sacked or retrenched corrpt collectors. However, if B is c10se to A, small shocks may
be sufficient to make the administration slide down into a high corrption leve! trap.
Therefore, although the tax administration may be c10se to a "c1ean" point, one should still
take corrption seriously.
It is problematic to test empirically the relevanee of the model discussed above. However, the
major objective of the ongoing anti-corrption campaign in Tanzania (see appendix 1) is to shift
the administrative equilibrium from a high-corrption to a low-corrption equilibrium.
10 Policy implications for fighting fiscal corruption
Corrption is a symptom of deep-seated economic, political and institutional weaknesses.
Consequently, to curb fiscal corrption it is essential to focus on its causes and rationale.
Emphasis should therefore be placed on preventive measures that contribute to reduce the
opportunities for and payoffs of corrption. Relevant measures would inc1ude economic,
political and institutional reforms, inc1uding reforms of the incentive schemes in the tax
administration.
The principal-agent-c1ient theory framework that we have used as our analytical point of
deparure elucidates some major incentive problems in tax administration: In general, we will
expect that tax collectors (agents) with an inc1ination to behave dishonestly wil do so with even
greater ease when they enjoy conferred monopoly power over taxpayers that can be exercised
without challenge, a high degree of diseretion, and limited accountability to the principal. By
the same token, the taxpayers (c1ients) may be wiling to pay bribes to reduce their tax
liabilities. In real li fe the principal (governent or treasury) cannot tell how much of the
outcomes of tax collection it observes are due to the tax collector's (agents) activities on his
behalf. After all, the collector has incentives to mislead the principal into thinking he is working
only on productive activities, never on corrpt ones.
On this basis, the literature on bureaucratie performanee suggests a c1uster of policy measures
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to fight corrption, all ofwhich rest on the assumption that the principal's objective is to reduce
corrption (Klitgaard, 1988; Mookherjee, 1997; Rauch and Evans, 1997). These measures
inc1ude reforms in incentive systems and organisational procedures:
1. Establish recruitment criteria for the staff that emphasise competence (merit) to reduce
the problems of advers e selection (section 3.2).
2. Change the disposition of rewards and penalties facing both the tax collector and the
taxpayer, to reduce the problems of moral hazard (section 3.2). Relevant measures for
tax collectors are schemes for intemal promotion based on merit and career stability.
Performanee related pay-schemes might also be considered. However, it is important to
stress that wage incentives (section 4) wIl only function in combination with other
measures, inc1uding credible policies of monitoring and punishment (section 5).
Penalties of tax offcials detected in corrption may inc1ude confiscation of incomes,
property and wealth.
3. Invest in information systems that increase the likelihood that fraudulent activities wIl be
detected and punished. To increase the accountability of tax officials, measures may be
introduced that require them to report their wealth annually to an independent body.
4. Institute administrative and organisational reforms that will reduce the agents
discretionary authority (section 6). Emphasis should be placed on tax reforms to create a
simple, non-discretionary tax system with moderate, uniform taxes, combined with the
removal of exemptions. Job-rotation for tax offcials should be considered to prevent
collusion between taxpayers and collectors. In general, direct contact between collectors
and taxpayers should be minimised.
5. Adopt measures and programmes designed to modify the agents attitudes toward
fraudulent behaviour over time. Such measures should aim at increasing the moral and
stigma costs connected to corrption (see section 5).
The list of areas of action inc1udes both short- and long-term policy measures. Altering rewards
and penalties, raising the probability of detection, and introducing administrative modifications
all contain elements that could be considered for relatively quick action. On the other hand,
changing the composition of staff, reforming the organisation, and conditioning attitudes
toward corrption are medium to long-term measures. It is, however, important to consider the
tradeoffs between what is feasible and credible over time.
Furthermore, the previous analysis has pointed to some major weaknesses of the standard
principal-agent approach to analysing fiscal corrption:
. Individual actors, for instanee tax collectors, rare ly operate in isolation (section 9).
. Several (multiple) principals with divergent objectives may seek to influence tax
enforcement (section 7).
. The individual stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement proeess may play different
roles dep ending on their various relations to other stakeholders (section 7).
. The principal(s) may be corrpt (section 7).
One result that can be drawn form the previous analysis, is that it may be dangerous to draw
conc1usions from mo dels that treat the individual actor as someone whose decisions are taken in
splendid isolation. For instance, in a world of interacting tax collectors gradualist anti-
corrption policies may be extremely ineffective if an "everyone is corrpt" norm has become
established in the society. The more widespread the knowledge that others are behaving
dishonestly, the more one may expect non-compliance to increase. Thus, publicity indicating
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extensive corrption in the institution or society may sometimes have effects contrary to what is
intended. Jf it becomes evident that the governent either is not effective in its application of
sanctions or is practising favouritism toward special interests, one will expect cynicism as well
. . 34as corrption to increase.
Thus, one means available to the governent for promoting "voluntary" compliance may then
be to co-ordinate the administrative staff by providing information and assurances that others
are in fact co-operating. Most importantly, the governent must co-ordinate sanctions in such a
way that the potentially compliant officials are convinced that sanctions can and will be
directed at the others. Even when people prefer to behave honestly, they still require assurances
that others are also complying. Otherwise they will feel "cheated" and may reconsider their own
wilingness to contrbute (Levi, 1988).
One potentially important channel to fight fiscal corrption at the local leve! is to inform the
general public as to what constitutes corrption (Kisubi, 1999). This may contribute to reducing
the public tolerance of corrption and encouraging citizens to actively report and provide
evidence of corrption. By giving people access to the facts that affect their welfare, public
servants may think twice about bre aking their trust. Increased transparency and focus on
corrption may thereby reduce the incidenee of corruption.35 Grassroots "watchdog"
organisations may play an important role in this context. However, as noted above, if nothing is
done in practice to curb corrption in spite of increased information this may lead to increased
frustration and cynicism among the general public.
Consequently, the successful implementation of anti-corrption efforts requires political wil
and cornmitment at the highest levels of governent (Riley, 1998). When the leve! of
corrption is high and nothing is done to punish corrpt leaders, public confidenee in the
political and administrative leadership is undermined. Corrpt leaders may also contribute to
reduce the stigma costs of corrption and "legitimise" lower leve! corrption. Thus, there is a
need to clean up the leadership ranks in order to restore respect. Hence, the Tanzanian
Commission on Corrption (URT, 1996) argues that "it is obvious that if we want to rid
ourselves of corruption, we must begin by cleaning the top leadership ranks".
The analysis provides us with some directions for future research. In improving our
understanding of the mechanisms behind fiscal corrption, there is a need to identify and
account for the roles of all key stakeholders involved in the proeess of tax enforcement - the
principals, their agents and the clients. This also includes an examination of the relationship
between the varous stakeholders. In particular, we know little about the roles of civil
organisations and international aid ageneies in this context, although initiatives to curb fiscal
corrption sometimes are taken by each of these stakeholders. Furhermore, a crucial question
is: Why has so many anti-corrption campaigns not succeeded? By answering this question we
might be able to identify the necessary criteria for sustainable corrption control.
34 Gunnar Myrdal (1968) quotes the Indian Prime Minister who once sa id: "Merely shoutingfrom the roofs that everybody is
corrupt creates an atmosphere of corruption. People feel they live in a climate of corruption and they get corrupted
themselves. "35 In the Indian state of Rajasthan, for instance, a people 's group holds public hearings on how money is spent by vilage
governments, comparing offcial documents with work actually performed (The Economist, 16 January 1999:19). One such
meeting in 1998 turned up records of some USD 1000 - much money to the vilage - having been spent on construction of
canals that infact had never been bu ilt. However, the Rajasthanis could call their leaders to account only because the vilagers
had access to offcial records.
27
References
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972): "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis", Journal of Public
Economics, VoLl (Nov.), 323-338.
Alm, James, Roy Bahl and Matthew N. Murray (1991): "Tax base erosion in developing countries". Economic
Development and Cultural Change, VoL. 39, No. 4, pp. 849"872.
Andvig, Jens (1993): ((Economic analysis of corrptioD)). pp. 228-253 in Arve Ofstad and Arne Wiig (eds.)
Development theory: Recent trends. Proceedings of the NFU annua L Conference 1992. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Report 1993:6.
Andvig, Jens and Kalle Moene (1990): ((How corrption may cortpÜ). Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization, 3/1: 63-76.
Bardhan, Pranap (1997): ((Corrption and development: A review of issues)). Journal of Economic Literature,
XXXV/3 (September): 1320-1346.
Becker, Gary S. (1968): "Crime and punishment: An economic approach", Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-
217.
Becker, Gary S. and George J. Stigler (1974): "Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of
enforcers", Journal of Legal Studies, VoL. 3, pp. l-19.
Besley, Timothy og John McLaren (1993): ((Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives)). Economic Journal,
103: 119-141.
Bird, Richard (1992): Tax policy and economic development. Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Bird, Richard (1990): "Expenditures, administration and tax reform in developing countries." International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation: Bulletin. June 1990, pp. 263-7.
Campbell, Donald E. (1995): Incentives. Motivation and the economics of information. Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Chand, Sheetal K. and Karl O. Moene: (1997): "Controlling fiscal corrption". Working Paper of the International
Monetary Fund, WP97/L00. Washington D.C.
CIET International (1996): The national integrity system in Tanzania. Parliamentarians workshop. Corrption
survey (August L O).
Cowell, Frank A. (1990): Cheating the government. The economics ofevasion. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cowell, Frank (l985): "The economic analysis of tax evasion", Bulletin of Economic Research, VoL. 37, pp. 163-
193.
Cunningham, Bert (1996): Tanzania: Strategy and action plan to reform Customs administration. Dar es Salaam:
Tanzania Revenue Authority.
Dixit, Avinash (1996): The making of economic policy. A transaction cost politics perspective. Cambridge M.A.:
MIT Press.
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge (1999): ((Controlling fiscal corrption: The case of Customs in Tanzania)). Bergen: Chr.
Michelsen Institute (forthcoming).
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge (1996): ((Tax evasion and corruption in local governents ID Tanzania: Alternative
economic approaches)). CMI Working Paper 1996:14. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute
28
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge and Joseph Semboja (1999): ((Local governent taxation and tax administration in
Tanzania)). Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (forthcoming).
Galtung, Fredrik (1998): ((Criteria for sustainable corrption controb The European Journal of Development
Research, io (June):pp. 105-128.
Galtung, Fredrik (1995): Current strategies for combating corruption: A study of corruption in the tax
administration. Berlin: Transparency International, Occasional Working Paper No. 8 (1995).
Gould, D. and J. Amaro-Reyes (1983): The effects of corruption on administrative performance: Ilustrationsfrom
developing countries. Washington D.C.: World Bank, StaffWorking Paper No. 580.
Hirshleifer, J. and J.G. Riley (l992): The analytics of uncertainty and information. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kaufmann, Daniel (1997): "Corrption: The facts." Foreign Policy, VoL. 107 (summer), pp. 114-131.
Kaufmann, Daniel (1999): "Anticorrption strategies: Starting afresh? Unconventional lessons from comparative
analysis." Chapte 2 (pp. 35-50) in Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh (eds.) Curbing corruption. Toward a
modelfor bui/ding national integrity. Washington D.C.: EDI Development Studies.
Kisubi, Mohammad M. (1999): (dnvolving civil society in the fight against corrptioD)). Chapter 9 (pp. 1 L 7-125) in
Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh Curbing corruption. Toward a model for bui/ding national integrity. EDI
Development Studies. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Klitgaard, Robert (1994): A framework for a country program against corruption. Berlin: Transparency
International, Occasional Working Paper No. 4 (1994).
Klitgaard, Robert (1988): Controllng corruption. Berkeley/London: University of California Press.
Kreps, David M. (1990): A course in microeconomic theory. London/ew York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Levi, Margaret (1988): Ofrule and revenue. Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
Lindbeck, Assar (1998): "Swedish lessons for post-socialist countries." Unpublished.
Low, Patrick (l995): "Preshipment inspection services." Washington D.C.: World Bank Discussion Paper 278.
Mans, Darius (1994): "Tanzania: resolute action", in L Hussain and R. Faruquee (eds.) Adjustment in Africa.
Washington D.C.: World Bank, pp. 352-426.
Mookherjee, D. (1997): "Incentive reforms in developing countr bureaucracies. Lessons from tax admistration",
Paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Mookherjee, D. and LP.L. Png (1995): "Corrptible supervisors and law enforcers: How should they be
compensated?" Economic Journal, VoL. 105, pp. 145-159.
Mukandala, R. (1983): "Trends in civil service size and income in Tanzania, 1967-1982." Canadian Journal of
African Studies, VoL. 17, No. 2, pp. 253-263.
Myrdal, Gunnar (1968): ((Corrption as a hindrance to modemization in South Asia)). I: G. Myrdal Asien drama:
An enquiry into the poverty of nations, VoL. Il. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968, s. 937-951.
Publisert på nytt i kapittel 25 i Heidenheimer et aL. 1989. Political corruption. New Brunswick/London:
Transaction Publishers.
Palmier, L. (1983): "Bureaucratic corruption and its remedies", in Michael Clark (ed.) Corruption, causes,
consequences and control. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Prudhomme, Rémy (1992): "Informal local taxation in developing countries." Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy, VoL. 10, pp. 1-17.
29
Pyle, David J. (1993): "The economics of taxpayer compliance", in P.M. Jackson (ed.) Current issues in public
sector economics. London: Macmilan, (chapter 3) pp. 58-93.
Rauch, James E. and Peter B. Evans (1997): "Bureaucratic strcture and bureaucratic performance in less
deve10ped countries" , Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of California, San Diego.
Rijckeghem, Caroline Van and Beatrice Weder (l997): ((Corruption and the rate of temptation: Do low wages in
the civil service cause corrption?)) Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, WP 97/73. Washington
D.C.
Riley, Stephen R. (1998): ((The political-economy of anti-corrption strategies in Africa.)) The European Journal
of Development Research, 10 (lune): pp. 129-159.
Sandbrook, Richard (l986): The politics ofAfrica's economic stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schelling, Thomas (1973): "Hockey helmets, concealed weapons, and daylight saving: A study ofbinary choices
with externalities", Journal ofConjlict Resolution, pp. 381-428.
Sedigh, Shahrzad and Alex Muganda (1999): ((The fight against corrption in Tanzania)). Chapter 11 (pp. 151-177)
in Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh Curbing corruption. Toward a model for bui/ding national integrity. EDI
Development Studies. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Semboja, Joseph (1995): "District council financing, integration and institution strengthening." In Joe Mullen et al.
Ki/osa District Rural Development Programme, Tanzania. Review of activities, 1991-1995. Dublin: Irish Aid,
Departent of Foreign Affairs.
Semboja, Joseph and Ole Therkildsen (1992): "Short-term mobilization for recurrent financing of rural local
govemments in Tanzania", World Development, VoL. 20, No. 8, pp. 110l-1 L 13.
Tanzi, Vito (1998): ((Corrption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope, and cures)). ¡MF Staff Papers
VoL. 45, No. 4 (Dec.), pp. 559-594.
Tanzi, Vito (1995): ((Corrption: arm's-length relationships and markets)). In: Gianluca Fiorentini og Sam
Peltzman (red.) The economics of organised crime. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 161-180.
Tanzi, Vito (1994): Corruption, governmental activities, and markets. Washington D.C.: IMF Working Paper
1994:99 (August).
Tanzi, Vito and Parthasarathi Shome (1993): A primer on tax evasion. Washington D.C.: IMF Staff Papers, VoL.
40, No. 4, pp. 807-828.
TCCIA (1995): Corruption and drug traffcking in Tanzania. A social-economic analysis. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania
Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture.
Transparency International (1998):
http://www.transparency.de/index. html
"Corrption perception index 1998." Internet
United Republic of Tanzania (1996): Report on the Commission on Corruption (the Warioba Report). Dar es
Salaam.
Webber, Carolyn and Aaron Wildavsky (1986): A h is to ry oftaxation and expenditure in the Western world. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
Wei, Shang-Jin (1999): ((Corrption in economic development. Beneficial grease, minor annoyance, or major
obstacle?)). Policy Research Working Paper 2048. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Wilson, James (1989): Bureaucracy. What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books.
World Bank (1994): Tanzania. Role of government. Public expenditure review. Vol. i, main report. Washington
D.C.: Eastern Africa Department, Countr Operations Division, Report No. 12601-TA.
30
Appendix 1: The Warioba Report
CORRUPTION IN TANZANIA
Some findings of the "Commission on Corrption"
(URT, 1996)
L Historical efforts to fight corruption:
1958:
1971:
1975:
1983:
1995:
1996:
The colonial Anti-Corrption Law
Extension of The Anti-Corrption Law
(investigation ofpeople being suspected of acquiring property through corrption).
Establishing the Anti-Corrption Unit.
Countrwide Govemmental campaign against "economic saboteurs"
(including corrpt lower and middle grade governent and parastatal employees).
The Law of Leadership Ethics
(specifies ethical standards required to be adhered to by public leaders; establishes a
secretariat under the Ethics Commissioner with capacity to investigate the conduct
ofleaders).
The Commission on Corrption
Chaired by Joseph Warioba (appointed in January, presented the report to the
President in December).
IL Two ma;or forms of corruption:
Petty corrption: Includes those who receive bribes because oftheir low incomes and
standard of living. What they receive only helps them make ends meet.
Grand corrption: Involving high level leaders and public servants whose involvement in
corrptive practices is a result of excessive greed for wealth accumulation and money. These
are people whose eamings are adequate to meet their basic needs and they have enough
property and money.
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IlL Reasons for growth and expansion of corruption:
The 1970's: Expansion of the public sector, Government heavily involved in
planning, regulating and runn ing the economy ("African socialism ''j.
Corruvtion was caused bv the following:
(a) Implementation problems ofLaws and Regulations.
(b) Administrative laxity and lack of Accountability.
(c) Lengthy and difficult procedures of obtaining public service.
(d) Scarcity of essential commodities.
(e) Low salaries coupled with rising cost of living before and after
retirement.
(f) Uncertainty over one's future.
(g) Lack of "political will".
(e) Managerial weaknesses of state organs.
The 1990's: Liberalisation and deregulation, changes in political and social
philosophy of the country.
Corruvtion is caused and characterised bv the following:
(a) Closeness between businessmen and politicalleaders.
(b) Lack of transparency in the economy.
(c) Appointment of corrpt leaders.
(d) Erosion of the integrity of leaders.
(e) The emergency of competition in conspicuous consumption.
(f) Changes in the countr's democratic structure (multi-part
system).
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IlL Recommendations:
1. Reducing the size of the public sector, and, thus, reducing its operating costs.
2. In creas ing salaries of public sector employees (also rising the pension
schemes).
Comment: Aims at reducing the problem of moral hazard through wage
ineentives (improving efforts by inereasing the opportunity eosts of being saeked
due to poor performanee).
3. Restoring the offces of the Auditor General and the Controller.
Comment: Improved monitoring to inerease the risks of being deteeted for illieit
behaviour.
4. Establishing new routines for recruitng junior staff to remove the present
practice of "favouritsm of relatives, friends and corruption ¡that) have ruled the
day.
Comment: To reduee the problem of advers e selection (more foeus on formal
qualifieations and advertising all vaeaneies).
5. Providing suffcient working tools and equipment for Government employees.
Comment: To improve administrative effieieney and plug the loopholes for
eorrption.
J; Conclusions:
"There is no questioning thefact that the country's leadership is being accused of
being involved in acts of corruption. There is an urgent need to take stern action
to dean up the leadership ranks in order to restore respect and public confdence
in the leadership" (p. 11).
"The Commission believe that in order to fight corruption, we must begin with the
leadership" (p. 19).
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